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A growing number of healthcare organizations are replacing their traditional record keeping methods with the electronic 
medical record (EMR) systems as part of an on-going effort toward the digitization of healthcare. With the growing use of 
this digital information system, concerns about the state of security for the EMR systems have also increased. In recent years, 
a large number of academic and non-academic research activities are directed toward the use and implementation of EMR, 
however, very few of these studies are focused on the issue of security within the EMR systems. This paper explores the 
basics of computer security and proposes security principles that should be considered as guidelines at the time of EMR 
systems implementations. Our analysis of the literature and theory provides new insight for researchers and assists healthcare 
practitioners with increased security for EMR adoption. 
 
Keywords (Required) 
Healthcare Information System, Hospital Security, Patients Security, Electronic Medical Record, EMR, EMR Security, 
Adoption, Hospital Information System. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Digitization of medical records is widely accepted by the healthcare professionals as one of the many ways to reduce the cost 
while at the same time improving the quality of healthcare. The rate of EMR adoptions by healthcare facilities in the United 
States, and associated research, has peaked in the past few years. Despite this trend, very few of these studies have focused on 
the security issues and concerns associated with the EMR systems, a sentiment reflected in many areas of IS research (Zafar 
and Clark, 2009). EMR systems provide an unique landscape to explore security practices, as the power structure and the 
independence of physicians is uncharacteristic of the traditional system user, and a far cry from the military environments 
where most information security practices originated (Adams, Sasse, and Lunt, 1997; Lapointe and Rivard, 2005; Wilkes, 
1991). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore and propose information security principles that should be considered as guidelines at 
the time of EMR design and implementation. As a result, we make a call for the development of usable and transparent 
security that is capable of meeting the specialized needs and the unique challenges present in medical organizations. 
 
Even though EMR is a relatively recent phenomena, we feel that continued exploration of adoption issues will strengthen the 
identity of the IS discipline through the exploration of salient issues and supporting the continued maintenance of the 
disciplines plasticity, two of the proposed drivers of academic legitimacy proposed by Lyytinen and King (2004). 
Specifically, by searching through the existing non-EMR security research, we provide a proposed adaptation to the needs of 
EMR systems, which we argue differ from the military and traditional organizations from which most accepted security 
practices originated. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an in-depth look into EMR systems by 
reviewing the extant literature. We then focus on the unique nature of EMR and how EMR systems differ from other 
healthcare systems. Finally, we will make the connection to computer security, focusing on the perceived security threats to 
EMR systems, and discuss the applicability of the security principles in the EMR systems to minimize those threats. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Hannan (1996) defined the Electronic Medical Record System (EMR) as “the storage of all health care data and information 
in electronic formats with the associated information processing and knowledge support tools necessary for the managing the 
health enterprise system”. EMR systems are designed to serve a variety of actors in the healthcare industry including 
physicians, nurses, hospital administrators and, most importantly, patients  (Lapointe and Rivard, 2005; Sprague, 2004). 
Healthcare providers, as the primary actors, can create, collect, store, manage, and exchange individuals’ medical information 
electronically in digital formats. The EMR systems directly impact patients by improving patient safety, supporting patient 
care, managing chronic conditions, and improving hospitals efficiencies (Sprague, 2004). 
 
EMR History: 
As early as 1958, programs were being designed to store and retrieve patient records (Stead, 1989). In the early 1970's, 
improving patient care became a primary goal with the creation EMR systems (Hannan, 1996). One of the earliest successful 
implementation of EMR system was in 1976 where it was demonstrated that the use of computer based medical record 
system resulted in a reduction of physicians’ errors in detecting life-threatening events (McDonald, 1976). In 1991, the 
Institute of Medicine identified the computer-based record systems as “an essential technology for healthcare” (Dick and 
Steen, 1991). In 1996, the Health Insurance Portability Act (HIPAA) directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to establish national standards for EMR systems (HIPAA, 1996). In 2004, the United States President issued an 
executive order setting an ambitious ten year goal of implementing EMR systems nationwide and providing all citizens with 
access to their health records (Ford, Menachemi, and Phillips, 2006). Finally, in 2009, a five year, $50 billion Presidential 
initiative aimed to link doctors and hospitals through new information technology, a plan that offered incentives for 
healthcare providers who utilized certified systems. Today, EMR systems serve as a complete workflow system for 
healthcare professional incorporating many routine tasks such as electronic prescription submission, patient order entry, 
diagnostic test ordering, test data analysis, patient billing, instant messaging, and patient alerts (Miller and Sim, 2004). 
 
EMR Benefits: 
Hillestad et al. (2005) conducted an in-depth study on the benefits of using EMR systems by healthcare organizations. They 
found that in addition to the quality improvements, EMR adopted hospitals could save over $80 billion annually and other 
parties such as Medicare and private payers were also projected to receive about $23 billion and $31 billion of the potential 
savings per year respectively. Several other studies support overwhelming benefits of EMR that outweigh costs and risks 
(Harrison and Ramanujan, 2011; Miller, West, Brown, Sim, and Ganchoff, 2005; Miller and West, 2007). 
 
EMR Adoptions: 
Despite the widely known benefits and a number of active incentive programs, few healthcare practitioners are yet using 
EMR systems. According to National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), the use of fully functional EMR systems has only 
reached to around 10% as of early 2010 (Hsiao, Hing, Socey, and Cai, 2010). Analyzing the recent trends of EMR adoption 
by healthcare practitioners, the most conservative estimate is that it will take until 2024 for around 87% of the physicians to 
adopt EMR systems (Ford et al., 2006). Although the rate of EMR adoption by the healthcare facilities is increasing, a recent 
National Research Council (NRC) committee found that “current efforts aimed at nationwide deployment of healthcare 
information technology will not be sufficient to achieve the vision of 21st century healthcare and may even set back the 
cause” (Stead and Lin, 2009). 
 
Barriers to Adoption: 
Although a significant number of studies (Harrison and Ramanujan, 2011; Hillestad et al., 2005; Miller and Sim, 2004; Miller 
et al., 2005; Miller and West, 2007; Sprague, 2004) suggest that the use of EMR systems could save billions of dollars every 
year, the rate of adoption is still quite low (Hsiao et al., 2010). The challenges healthcare organizations face when 
implementing EMR includes high initial costs, lack of funding, technological difficulties, lack of standards, difficulties with 
training and resistance to implementation/adoption by key stakeholders (Hoffmann, 2009; Lapointe and Rivard, 2005; Miller 
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Usable Security 
Research on information security has traditionally focused on the technical strength, with less attention on the weakest link, 
the user (Adams et al., 1997; Keith, Shao, and Steinbart, 2007). For example, the benefits of a strong password are nullified 
when a user, who not knowing any better, releases their secret phrase. At the root of this problem is the assumption that even 
a sophisticated a security system requires the user to use it properly.  Despite a wide variety of research on user friendly 
alternatives, such options have not reached mainstream adoption (Kreider and Rao, 2010). 
 
Even in the earliest days of information security, security practices and policies represented overheard for system users. The 
earliest practitioners of information security were those in rigid military environments, where it was safe to assume users 
could be forced to comply at the command of superiors, or be subject to harsh penalties (Adams et al., 1997; Wilkes, 1991). 
In organizations that exhibit this strong top down, authoritarian power structure, general deterrence theory predicts that the 
disincentives as the result of non-compliance will deter deviant acts (Straub, 1990). Environments where EMR systems are 
adopted exhibit a different user landscape and power structure, where physicians possess a far greater power of choice over 
what systems to use than the average user (Lapointe and Rivard, 2005). Furthermore, medical organizations differ in the fact 
the decisions made by physicians can result in the life or death of another human being, decisions that often need to be made 
in real time, and with the highest quality information. Imagine a physician who loses a smart card and/or forgets the password 
to a secure EMR system. Such a physician, needing critical access, could either go through proper channels and possibly 
endanger a patient's life, or circumvent proper security policies and practices by sharing passwords and/or smart cards. 
 
Despite these major differences in medical organizations, the security practices implemented still leave the user as the 
weakest link. As a result, we expect that medical professionals will be more likely to circumvent EMR specific security 
artifacts and policies when convenient, thus increasing the role the user plays in reducing system security. As Keith, Shao, 
and Steinbart (2009)  noted, when/if users decide not to comply with security policies perceived to be intrusive and 
counterproductive, overall system security will decline. Based on this, we argue that when developing security policies and 
practices for EMR systems, usable and transparent security practices should be preferred over those that are more intrusive, 
even if more technically sound. 
 
SECURE EMR FRAMEWORK 
Global EMR systems follow the trends set by e-commerce and financial industries by providing robust and ubiquitous 
services. Despite nearly a decade of industry wide efforts, system security still remains elusive. Even after significant, and 
well studied efforts (Hutchinson and Warren, 2003) to ensure total security of these systems, security breaches are still 
ongoing issues in the financial, banking, and e-commerce industries (Rotchanakitumnuai and Speece, 2003; Yenisey, Ozok, 
and Salvendy, 2005). 
 
Based on several recent high profile incidents, the healthcare industry has proven vulnerable to lapses in security, resulting in 
large volume identity thefts. Given the nature of the healthcare industry and the amount of personal information available, the 
consequences of identity theft can be far worse than a similar act in the financial and banking industries (JSPC, 2007). Given 
that only 10-20% of healthcare facilities have adopted EMR, the healthcare industry has arguably not yet experienced the 
security issues to the same extent other industries have experienced. Based on the close relation to e-commerce and financial 
industries, we argue that as the adoption of EMR by the healthcare providers continues to grow, the concern about security 
and privacy will become an increasingly important issue. However, despite the wealth of research on EMR and security, very 
few of these studies are actually focused on EMR security, combining the two together, as well as on the issues and concerns 
associated with EMR systems. 
 
To understand what sets EMR system security apart from traditional systems, a thorough understanding of how they differ 
both in terms of the specific security threats and counter-measures is necessary. This will help us to develop the appropriate 
security principles against those threats. To define and understand the concept of security in terms of healthcare, we turned to 
the US Department of Health and Human Services where security is defined as “the protection of information and 
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (USDHHS, 2004). To define security attributes associated with EMR systems, 
Conklin (2009) derived computer security attributes from Landwehr (2001) which were authentication, accountability, audit 
ability, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Conklin's analysis of these EMR security attributes occur at the system 
level, but had not been applied to a practical scenario. 
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Therefore, we have chosen to analyze the security threats associated with EMR systems and propose security principles that 
could be used to manage these threats. One unique nature of EMR systems is that, unlike other healthcare systems, EMR 
systems can be considered and categorized as encompassing the ensemble view of the IT artifact, where it is important to 
view the artifact as part of a computer system, and not just as an isolated artifact (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001). Therefore 
most, if not all, of the threats associated with computer systems should also be applicable to the EMR systems. Drawing from 
past literature dealing with computer security and associated threats (ACR–SIIM, 2009; CMS, 2006; Einwechter, 2002; 
Landwehr, 2001; Rindfleisch, 1997), we have categorized the threats to EMR systems into two groups: Internal (insider) 
threats and External (outsider) threats. 
 
Insider Threats 
Insider threats are risks of intended damage on a system posed by an authorized user of that system. Traditionally, security 
practitioners devote most resources to external threats, but some consider insider abuse to be the greatest threat (Einwechter, 
2002; Warkentin and Willison, 2009). Insider threats can be broken into three types: Insider Curiosity, Insider Subornation, 
and Accidental Disclosures (Rindfleisch, 1997). Insider curiosity is the abuse of access privileges by medical workers out of 
curiosity or for own purposes. A pharmacist misusing privilege to check others’ medical history is considered as an act of 
insider curiosity. Insider subornation can be defined as intentionally accessing information and releasing to outsiders for 
spite, revenge or profit. Accidental disclosure arises in situations when medical personnel make innocent and un-intentional 
mistakes which may lead to disclosures of sensitive information, such as misplacing a laptop with patient records. 
 
External Threats 
External threats are risks of intended damage to a system posed by unauthorized user of that system. External threats to EMR, 
defined in HIPPA fall into three categories: Threats to Confidentiality, Threats to Integrity, Threats to Availability (ACR–
SIIM, 2009; Barrows and Clayton, 1996; Bodin, Gordon, and Loeb, 2005; CMS, 2006). The threat to confidentiality occurs 
when sensitive information are made available to unauthorized personnel or processes (Hash, Bowen, Johnson, Smith, and 
Steinberg, 2008). Given the nature of private medical information and the trust patients have with their doctors, preservation 
of confidentiality should be a primary concern. Failure to protect confidentiality could result in a loss of trust between doctor 
and patient, potentially resulting in lower quality of treatment. Threats to integrity can be defined as threats by which data or 
sensitive information are altered or destroyed by in an unauthorized manner (Hash et al., 2008). Healthcare practitioners 
make life and death decisions and need access to the highest quality information. A patient's records that have been tampered 
with or destroyed in an unauthorized manner have the potential to detrimentally influence patient care. Threats to availability 
can be defined as any threat that hinders the accessibility and usability of sensitive information when demanded by 
authorized personnel (Hash et al., 2008). As medical organizations become increasingly reliant on the ability to monitor and 
perform tasks in real time, being denied legitimate access to the system has the potential to reduce the quality of patient care. 
 
The threats to EMR systems should not only be considered in terms of threats to the system, but also by how a violation 
would potentially affect patient care. In the next section, we will discuss and propose the security principles that could be 
used to minimize these threats to EMR systems. 
 
PROTECTION MECHANISMS 
In recent years, a number of incidents have been reported where patients’ identities were compromised and medical 
information was fraudulently used to obtain prescription drugs (Andrews, 2008). With the increased use of EMR systems by 
healthcare providers the number of fraudulently use of medical information is also expected to increase (Alexander, 2006). 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) developed and specified a set of privacy and security laws 
and regulations against these threats. However, as stated by Conklin (2009), “these regulations specify responsibility for 
protecting the information but do not specify how to achieve this protection”. 
 
EMR systems are used by many different actors such as doctors, nurses, lab technicians, administrators, and data entry 
workers, with many different levels of responsibility and workloads. Security policies or processes intended to increase 
security at the cost of patient care should be carefully scrutinized. Specific practices and policies deemed appropriate within 
the healthcare providers’ workflow should be designed and implemented in such a way that the risk of direct impact on 
patient care is minimized. Again viewing EMR through the ensemble view of technology, we start with the general computer 
security principles and practices presented by Landwehr (2001). 
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Accountability 
Accountability is the state of being accountable, liable, or answerable.  Accountability is implemented through identification, 
authentication, authorization and auditing (Bhargav-Spantzel, Squicciarini, and Bertino, 2006; Landwehr, 2001).  
Identification asks a user who they are, authentication verifies their claim, authorization verifies what they can do, and 
auditing keeps track of what they have done (Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2006; Evans Jr, Kantrowitz, and Weiss, 1974; Hovav 
and Berger, 2009). Implementing the accountability security principle within EMR systems, it is possible to minimize the 
insider threats of curiosity, subornation, and accidental disclosure by the authorized users of the systems. Accountability 
mechanisms represent an area where current technologies may not be sufficient to meet medical organizations specialized 
needs. Traditionally, accountability mechanisms have not been held in the highest regard by users and administrators alike, 
due to both the excessive burden placed on the user, and the ease with which users can circumvent a technically strong 
system (Furnell, 2005; Keith et al., 2009). 
 
Least Privilege 
Given the large number of EMR system users, and the wide variety of information and services available, EMR users should 
be granted the least level of access necessary (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975). Furthermore, due to disparities in user 
responsibilities, least privilege is of critical importance to maintaining integrity of functionalities such as electronic 
prescriptions and test ordering. A least privilege security principles implemented at the process level should minimize the 
threats to availability, insider curiosity, and insider subornation threats. 
 
Minimize the Complexity 
As the level of effort required to establish trust is generally proportional to size and complexity, minimizing the complexities 
of the EMR system should minimize the risks of misuse and assurance cost. As medicine is one of the oldest disciplines, 
dealing with the complexities of human life, the design of a simple system may be somewhat idealistic. If oversimplification 
can result in lack of functionality, and excessive complexity can result in lack of security, a careful tradeoff should be made 
in the design of EMR systems. The complexity attribute must be implemented at the time of system design. An EMR system 
designed with an appropriate level of complexity, should help to reduce the threat to availability, and quality of patient care. 
 
Default Security 
From the onset, adequate security mechanisms and policies should be enabled by default for EMR systems. Default security 
should be applied in any situation where a threat could be preemptively mitigated, such as in the configuration of user 
accounts, and applications. By establishing default security, accidental oversights in the principal of least privilege should be 
minimized. The default security attribute should be  at the time of system implementation and integration and should aim to 
reduce the threats to availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the system. 
 
Defense in Depth 
Any amount of efforts to ensure total security of a system may be inadequate. Given the constant and rapid changing nature 
of security, it is impossible for a system to exhibit total. Therefore, in order to deal with ongoing security threats, defense in 
depth is a best strategy to implement in information systems. EMR systems should be designed with multiple security 
features such as data classification, data encryption, strong security policies, and audit policies enforcement. Implementing 
defense in depth security feature will minimize the threats of unauthorized disclosure and disruption of healthcare 
information. 
 
Regardless of the amount of security measures that are put in place within the system or within the processes, security 
breaches are expected. Therefore, in addition to the above security principles, number of additional steps can be taken in 
order to strengthen the security of EMR systems. Because of the unique nature of information security, Geer (2010) 
suggested to design information system with the aim of risk absorption rather than risk avoidance. Risk absorption of an 
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Threats Category Threats Types Actions Lead to Threats Protection Mechanisms 
Internal Threats 
Insider curiosity 
Abuse or misuse of access 
privilege for curiosity 
Accountability, Least Privilege 
Insider Subornation 
Abuse or misuse of access 
privilege for revenge or profit 
Accountability, Least Privilege 
Accidental 
Disclosures 








Default Security, Defense in 
Depth 
Threat to Integrity 
Unauthorized Disclosure 
Unauthorized Disruption 
Default Security, Defense in 
Depth 
Threat to Availability 
Unauthorized Modification 
Unauthorized Destruction 
Least Privilege, Default Security, 
Minimize complexity 
Table 1: EMR Security Threats and Protection Mechanisms 
Detection and Monitoring 
Adequate processes must be established to identify the incidents as well as to identify system and process flaws. Detection 
and monitoring capabilities should function as an alarm system and direct proper resources once the security incidence is 
detected. Detection and monitoring techniques should be designed to protect confidentiality of doctor patient privilege, and 
maintain the integrity of the healthcare organizations primary function. 
 
Response and Recovery 
The ability to respond and recover quickly to a security compromise can ensure minimal loss from both a technology, and 
patient care perspective. For EMR functionality that has the potential to directly influence patient care if compromised, 
appropriate alternative processes should be in place to ensure that the quality of care is not degraded.  Once system service 
has been resumed, additional processes should be in place to quickly recover from the system down time, requiring minimal 
overhead for system users. 
 
Continuous Improvement 
Similar to other securities, information security is also a continuous process. Organizations must dedicate resources to follow 
the most up-to-dated technology trends. Organizational policies and processes must be updated as the technology and with it 
the security threats changes. On-going events must be closely monitored and key learning from every event must be logged 
and used to improve the current state of the systems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
With the increased use of EMR systems by the healthcare facilities, number of security threats targeting these systems and its 
information are also rapidly growing. Steps must be taken to ensure the safety and security of these systems. Securing 
information systems containing large amount of valuable public data can be a daunting tasks. Implementing the proposed 
security principles should minimize the security threats discussed in this paper. In addition to the security principles, steps 
must be taken to implement the risk absorption measures. Considering these security efforts may not guarantee a totally 
secured system but they will certainly minimize the threats to EMR systems’ security. 
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